Ilse/Lies: Nietzsche and/in Pynchon

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Nietzsche and Pynchon have, as has been said recently of Nietzsche and Emerson, an “elective affinity” (Stack). This affinity is especially close on questions of truth and knowledge, and closest in Nietzsche’s later philosophy and Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (hereafter GR). While Nietzsche’s early theories of truth and knowledge have won most attention recently, his later writings—from On the Genealogy of Morals (hereafter GM) onward—reject these theories as being indebted to a Schopenhauerian representationalism and pursue the claim that knowledge is perspectival.¹ In this essay I argue for an affinity between Nietzsche’s later philosophy and GR on questions of truth and knowledge. In particular, I focus on the ways GR rejects theories of truth and knowledge based on objectivity and coherence, and offers instead a theory of truth and knowledge similar to Nietzsche’s perspectivism.

A substantial body of GR readings argues that the novel presents a system of knowledge supported by a model of ontological coherence. These arguments take many forms, but they most often appeal to the convention of character coherence to justify their claims. The episode that frequently serves as an example of character-level coherence is the Pökler episode.² According to this logic, the episode tells the story of “poor harassed” Franz Pökler (GR 426), whose desire for “impersonal salvation” (406), transcendence (cf. 400), leads him to fall under the control of Nazi power despite a coexisting desire for “personal identity” (406) constantly at odds with his being subsumed. This struggle—set up as a battle between Pökler’s proper or true identity and, as his colleague Kurt Mondaugen puts it, “the pure, the informationless state of signal zero,” impersonal transcendence (404)—is thus ripe with pathos: the hero eventually succumbs or sacrifices himself to the salvation of impersonality, and paradoxically realizes his error too late, after anything like “Pökler” might have been salvaged. This hermeneutic of tragedy could extend Pökler’s story to the condition of the preterite in GR as a whole: preterites’ proper selves are constantly threatened by the various They-systems scheming to possess them for malevolent purposes.

The episode would be tragic were it to identify and maintain a coherent definition of Pökler’s self—a “fear of extinction named Pökler”
(406) clearly established and persisting throughout the episode. Defining Pökler’s identity presupposes a foundational “Zero point” (cf. 223, 426) around which all other subsequently identified elements of that which is Pökler cohere. The personal identity of Pökler cannot be a random composite or assemblage of contingently related parts; some essential unit must be found to produce a true self which becomes unified through processes of comparison. This unity of related parts must then pass through time coherently, which is to say that the unit must guarantee the proper sequence of its trajectory. The truth of Pökler’s identity would thus be known by an objective persistence of essential unity.

Substantial evidence of a coherent Pökler does appear in the episode. Because Pökler’s “Berlin self” (405) both precedes and stands in contradistinction to what comes to be his Rocket self, the Berlin self can be seen as his proper self, and thus serve to cohere each successive manifestation of Pökler’s identity. It allows one, for example, to perceive the Rocket self as a threat in the first place. The Berlin self comes out of (is an already compromised form of) a less contaminated life of youthful “idealism” (399) and functions throughout the episode to condition Pökler’s identity crises. As the Rocket begins to “[beckon] him in” (406), as he becomes aware of “some assumption of Pökler into the calculations, drawings, graphs, and even what raw hardware there was,” what retrieves Pökler at the brink of a Rocket self is the “linger[ing]” “poor Berlin self” (405). What in fact distinguishes Pökler from Mondaugen and Fahringer is his resistance to the impersonal salvation of the Rocket’s “zero signal” (406), a resistance grounded in and affected by his proper Berlin self.

Pökler’s Berlin self, according to a tragic reading of the episode, is most severely tested, through Weissmann’s “palpable evil” (421), by the annual visits of his real/reel daughter, Ilse. The viability of coherence and sequence is poignantly foregrounded in the epistemological problem of Ilse’s existence. If Pökler accepts each appearance of Ilse as Ilse proper—his real daughter—then, ironically, he must disavow his Berlin self and become properly the Rocket self, which is precisely Weissmann’s aim. For according to every testing method Pökler devises, all determined by the historical and biographical characteristics of his Berlin self, each Ilse that appears is different from the memory of his real daughter. Accepting her as real, according to the standard of his Berlin self, superimposes Weissmann’s identification of her over Pökler’s, and thus fills “the vacuum of his life” (407) with a Weissmann-supplied image. Rejecting her as unreal, or projecting her as reel (as a produced image with the same epistemic status as a
character on film), again according to the standard of the Berlin self, reasserts Pökler’s proper identity, though possibly—and crucially—at the cost of her actual reality.⁴

Seen this way, Pökler’s problem of identifying the proper Ilse foregrounds a modern problem of knowledge generally thought to be raised by Descartes. The Cartesian project of securing clear and distinct ideas as guarantors of truth claims bears directly on Pökler’s real/reel crisis. Like the potentially infinite *mise en abyme* Pökler faces in the problem of Ilse’s objectivity, Descartes’s abyssal self-reflexivity is resolved by the absolutism of the Archimedean point of stable unity. Metaphysical unity grants ontological coherence to subjectivity in general by being prior to and guaranteeing the unity-as-object (Descartes 99). While Kant dispossesses the *cogito* by demonstrating that the thinking subject cannot be objectified, he nevertheless reinscribes a Neoplatonic unity into the concept of modern subjectivity. Kant’s guaranteeing the unity of objective subjectivity through the inference of apperceptive unity echoes Descartes’s resolving the potentially infinite regress of self-reflexivity: both appeal to an *a priori* concept of unity—of noncompositeness—to prevent the contingencies of phenomenal existence from overwhelming coherent subjectivity.⁵

Both, in short, preconceive subjectivity as necessarily unified or unity-based (as what Nietzsche refers to as the “subject-substratum”), and work from there to develop a system that guarantees coherence; and both work to guarantee the presence of unity in empirical experience by the proposition of an ideal, trans-subjective unity.

Reading the Pökler episode as a tragedy, as the fall of Pökler from his true identity into a fractured condition of compositeness, participates, then, in a modern rational concept of knowledge according to which knowledge is guaranteed by a metaphysical correspondence to the thing-in-itself. Pökler’s true self, unified by virtue of being most proximate to his metaphysical ideal self, is threatened with becoming an improper or tragically composite self (the Rocket self). Reading Pökler this way requires several assumptions, including that we know who Pökler is; that we can retain this knowledge throughout the episode; that there is no compelling evidence in the episode which undermines our knowledge of Pökler.

Nietzsche’s influence on twentieth-century Continental philosophy stems from his rejection of metaphysical truth—which is also what gets him into trouble. That is, the basic contradiction already apparent in the notion of rejecting metaphysical truth—that one must know truth metaphysically to reject it—continues to divide Nietzsche studies. Arthur C. Danto’s reading of Nietzschean perspectivism rejects the
thing-in-itself, arguing that “we cannot speak of a true perspective, but only of the perspective that prevails,” and that we are left merely to persuade others of this perspective (Danto 77). Rejecting the thing-in-itself leads to a loss of the possibility of comparison: no common standard can be used to conceive of any one perspective as superior to another. But, as Maudemarie Clark and Gilles Deleuze have shown (in very different ways), Danto’s argument runs into trouble by presupposing the intrinsic validity of each perspective (see Deleuze, chapters 1 and 3). If all perspectives are of equal cognitive value—if each perspective can be as true as any other—then all perspectives are limited or one-sided. If perspectives were one-sided, then Nietzsche’s genealogical claims about morality would be trivialized by being true only relative to his own perspective. For example, Nietzsche says in GM (III, 16) that “man’s sinfulness is not a ‘fact,’ but merely the interpretation of a fact, namely of physiological depression—the latter viewed in a religio-moral perspective that is no longer binding on us” (Nietzsche 565). Nietzsche makes truth claims to fact based on historical analysis—claims which presuppose a qualitative difference between perspectives—but, crucially, he does not make truth claims that derive from the metaphysical thing-in-itself. Superiority of perspective is not necessarily guaranteed by objective truth: any number of other guarantees or warrants may obtain, including cognitive interests and standards of rational acceptability, neither of which is indexed to objectivity. Nietzsche holds also that an objective truth may become superior depending on the context. Perspectivalist truth thus presupposes the immense possibility and pluralism of the contingency of contextual determination.

Reading the Pökler episode in terms of Nietzschean perspectivism allows for the contextuality of truth claims about identity in GR. I address this problem of truth claims by pursuing the episode’s treatment of the building blocks of objectivity: coherence and sequence. The line between the ending of the Slothrop/Erdmann episode and the beginning of the Pökler episode is so blurred that it is impossible to identify the proper beginning of the Pökler episode on objective grounds.

She comes once, then perhaps again before Slothrop puts the whip down and climbs on top, covering her with the wings of his cape, her Schlepzig-surrogate, his latest reminder of Katje . . . and they commence fucking, the old phony rack groaning beneath them, Margherita whispering God how you hurt me and Ah, Max . . . and just as Slothrop’s about to come, the name of her child: strained through her perfect teeth, a clear extrusion of pain that is not in play, she cries, Bianca. . . . (GR 397)
This scene may be read under the assumption of character-level coherence. If so, Max Schlepzig would be “just a random alias” for Slothrop (395), distinct from the Slothrop known in other episodes, and his participation in Erdmann’s fantasy as her Schlepzig-surrogate would be categorized as his performing a role, assuming a mask as a means to fulfill his desire. But already a problem with coherence emerges in the idea of performance. Neither Erdmann nor Schlepzig is a true name: “It wasn’t his real name. Erdmann wasn’t mine. But anything with Earth in it was politically safe—Earth, Soil, Folk . . . a code” (395). Their names are code, but for what is not made explicit. Moreover, Erdmann’s use of the past tense suggests that she and Schlepzig substituted their code names for their original names.\footnote{If so, this raises the possibility that “Erdmann” is no longer exclusively performed according to a notion of difference understood as difference from a central referent. Instead, “Erdmann” may also open to multiple, contextual performances, with the possibility of referring to a pre-Erdmann proper name as well as to an unknown number of contextually determined referents. In other words, it is possible that neither Slothrop nor the reader knows who Erdmann is: she could be the Erdmann performing a role of difference from her proper name, or one of the many Erdmanns without reference to a proper name.}

This problem of identifying the nature of Erdmann affects our comprehension of Slothrop. Slothrop’s assumed name is itself an assumed name, the combination of which establishes the possibility of a serial model of identity rather than a centralized model. Depending on the context, as long as Slothrop bears the Schlepzig passport, his identity can assume any possible nature, including reference to “Slothrop” or, in the case of his encounter with Erdmann, reference to a particular moment in a particular movie or relationship. What is more, the name and identity Slothrop appear here to be composite. “[S]omebody has already educated him” to be cruel in precisely the way Erdmann wants him to be. Slothrop’s acknowledging “their” cruelty as “his own cruelty” (396) is not necessarily an affirmation of an idealized unified psyche; the pronoun his reveals the possibility of a multiplicity of forces motivating and/or constituting a transient and contingently animated desire. The possibility, then, that Slothrop and Erdmann are composite characters is added to the ambiguous ending of the reenacted *Alpdrücken* scene and the beginning of its original showing:

... yes, bitch—yes, little bitch—poor helpless *bitch* you’re coming can’t stop yourself now I’ll whip you again whip till you *bleed*. ... Thus Pökler’s whole front surface, eyes to knees: flooded with tonight’s image
of the delicious victim bound on her dungeon rack, filling the movie screen—close-ups of her twisting face, nipples under the silk gown amazingly erect, making lies of her announcements of pain—*bitch!* she loves it . . . and Leni no longer solemn wife, embittered source of strength, but Margherita Erdmann underneath him, on the bottom for a change, as Pökler drives in again, into her again, yes, *bitch*, yes. . . .

Only later did he try to pin down the time. [. . .] How many other men [. . .] carried the same image back from *Alpdrücken* to some drab fat excuse for a bride? How many shadow-children would be fathered on Erdmann that night?

It was never a *real* possibility for Pökler that Leni might get pregnant. But looking back, he knew that had to be the night, *Alpdrücken* night, that Ilse was conceived. (397)

At the level of narrative content (Slothrop and Erdmann reenact a scene from *Alpdrücken*, and Pökler views it, across time), the level of theme (Slothrop, already disguised, envisioning Katje, becomes Erdmann’s Schlezipg-surrogate just as Leni becomes Pökler’s Erdmann surrogate), and the level of graphical interface (the ellipses ending the first scene and beginning the next suggest that one could splice the juxtaposed frames together), the two episodes emphasize their compositeness. Is it clear at what point the Erdmann of the prior scene changes, transmutes, into the Erdmann of the subsequent scene? Is it clear who the referent of “*bitch*” is? Or who is saying it? These questions, moreover, occur in the context of tropes at work throughout the novel, namely, sexual desire as a heightened occasion for questions of identity and selfhood, and film as a conduit for identity.

Furthermore, each of these questions is preceded by another instance of the problem of coherence and sequence which uses the “unwholesome” “cosmology” of points to make its point.

How the penises of Western men have leapt, for a century, to the sight of this singular point at the top of a lady’s stocking, this transition from silk to bare skin and suspender! [. . .] Any underwear enthusiast worth his unwholesome giggle can tell you [. . .] there is a cosmology: of nodes and cusps and points of osculation, mathematical kisses . . . *singularities*! Consider cathedral spires, holy minarets, the crunch of trainwheels over the points as you watch peeling away the track you didn’t take . . . mountain peaks rising sharply to heaven, such as those to be noted at scenic Berchtesgaden . . . the edges of steel razors, always holding potent mystery . . . rose thorns that prick us by surprise . . . even, according to the Russian mathematician Friedmann, the infinitely dense point from which the present Universe expanded. (396)
Points are shown not to be resolved unities but to be simultaneously composite "detonating" singularities capable of infinite density and functionally bounded unit-like points of the kind that allow for a differentiation from "no-point" (396). Perceiving these points as coherent requires an obfuscation of their apparent compositeness; perceiving them as composite is an absurdity (the instant one identifies a composite point, one has rendered it coherent). The two concepts, coherence and compositeness, must therefore be apposed to one another—an apposition, on epistemic grounds, beyond resolution. If epistemology is thereby rendered effectively mute—if, that is, it becomes impossible to answer on epistemological grounds the question who is Slothrop or Erdmann?—then, pace Nietzsche, context comes to bear. That is, when GR’s narrator asks, "Do all these points imply, like the Rocket’s, an annihilation? What is that, detonating in the sky above the cathedral? beneath the edge of the razor, under the rose?" (396), it is not enough to appeal on an epistemological basis for a response by attempting either to answer the question (Yes, they imply an annihilation—watch out!) or to dismiss it outright (An unanswerable question—I reject it). Both attempts assume knowledge of the nature of points which may or may not be available, depending on the context.  

Instead, like Nietzsche in GM, GR enjoins its readers to pursue the question on several levels (Do they imply an annihilation? Who is asking the question? Why is the question being asked?); to affirm the possibility that knowledge of the correct answer may be impossible (there may be many answers, each correct according to a contingent determination); and to make a judgment or act according to one’s conviction at the time, as Pökler eventually does just after the red-herring scene of “amazing incest” (420) by choosing to believe in Ilse’s identity when “no real chain of events could have […] established for sure” the truth of Ilse (421).

The implication of all these points is thus precisely unending: whereas a Cartesian or Kantian resolution of the problem of points grants an ideal unity to the Zero point so it can become the foundational point from which all coherent trajectories (of self, of narrative) may commence or toward which they may be aimed, GR follows Nietzsche by indicating the irresolvable compositeness of all operational points. Nietzsche’s metaphor of perspective describing knowledge in GM (III, 12) demonstrates the impossibility of an omniperspectival (idealistic) view:

[Let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as “pure reason,” “absolute spirituality,” “knowledge in itself”; they always demand
that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. (Nietzsche 555)

Points are always already operational. They are an aesthetic “knotting into” (GR 3), not a manifestation of rational principles of clarity and unity. The perspectivism of points stipulates the undoing of the metaphysical groundwork for the coherent subject and the coherent narrative, and the undoing of the capacity to establish a coherent set and to move from point to line. Without a stable and unified point from which to begin or to point to, points become contextually determined.

To be more precise, a different concept of coherence is needed to account for incoherent sequence. Take Ilse again, one of the shadow-children conceived in the wake or silvery glow of Alpdrücken. Her ontological status, for both Pökler and the reader, is contingent on Pökler’s desire to unify her into a coherent identity, as are the possibilities for Pökler and Ilse of having a coherent identity based on unity. Recall, too, that Ilse was conceived in the identity-confusion of at least three possible scene- and time-references (Pökler and Leni; Pökler and Erdmann as Alpdrücken was originally shown; Pökler/Slothrop/Schlepzig and Erdmann/Erdmann in the retrospective enactment of Alpdrücken), a confusion which engendered the Pökler episode itself. If Pökler were to absolutely identify the real Ilse, then they would both be guaranteed a unified identity; their identities would be shown to have been guaranteed by the a priori principle of unity. But Ilse is the figure of incoherence par excellence: no epistemically-derived methods are available for Pökler to distinctly measure her real existence. Ilse consists of discrete annual frames with no intrinsic potential for objective continuity:

A daughter a year, each one about a year older, each time taking up nearly from scratch. The only continuity has been her name, and Zwölffinder, and Pökler’s love—love something like the persistence of vision, for They have used it to create for him the moving image of a daughter, flashing him only these summertime frames of her, leaving it to him to build the illusion of a single child. (422)

We may note that, if Ilse’s continuity is linked to her name—an anagram for Lies—then Pynchon’s characteristically tricky nomenclature is once again pointing us toward the aporia of subjectivity. Be that as it may, we can better approach Ilse through the problem of the real/reel
in GR, especially as the question of Ilse’s potential for coherent subjectivity is earlier linked to Leibniz. The narrator notes that a “strange connection between the German mind and the rapid flashing of successive stills to counterfeit movement” has existed “since Leibniz, in the process of inventing calculus, used the same approach to break up the trajectories of cannonballs through the air” (407).

Leibniz’s theory of the monadic self offers an alternative to idealized notions of unified coherence by its development of a model of unity that is opposed to compositeness. Thus the monadic self, for the purposes of my argument, can be seen as compatible with Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Briefly, while Leibniz distinguishes between physical compounds and metaphysical true substances, he rejects a notion of compounds as either being merely aggregates or having been guaranteed unity by a purely noumenal agent. An army (think again of the distribution about the Ellipse of Uncertainty) is a composite of parts temporally linked by a common “mode,” but it is not unified as such. There is no “necessary connection” between parts: any part can be replaced by another part, and the whole maintains an empirical “borrowed” reality—a reality “borrowed from its constituents”—not a reality determined a priori (Leibniz 50).8 For Leibniz, for the body to reach the status of unity at the physical level, it must have a soul or “real unit of the animal” (50)—a monad—but movement between metaphysical and physical levels is best described as one of modification, not inference. The monad, an indivisible unit, irreducible and noncomparable, modifies through division and subdivision into physical form (which is neither substantial nor fixed). The modifications that occur between metaphysical monad and physical body are accidental—they yield neither a predictability of potential monadic form nor an opportunity to return to the metaphysical monad through a genealogical process. And while the physical body is a modification of the monad, it is also an infinity of elements or parts. Finally, there is an infinity of monads. A monad can be neither formed nor unmade; it can neither begin nor end naturally. And yet the monad links the parts of the compound physical form into a temporal and spatial modal unity. On the one hand, a cannonball’s trajectory is composed of many monadic modal units, each of which is a modification of a metaphysical monad and thus a modally unified composite; on the other hand, the trajectory is itself a monad tending toward a certain, though unpredictable, location. Each moment of the cannonball is both contingently related to its predecessor and successor, and modally unified by the monad of the cannonball.

Leibniz’s model of coherence and sequence, coupled with Nietzsche’s perspectivism, provides a model of unity based on
compositeness and contextuality. The crucial point for Leibniz with regard to achieving unity, the point at which he proposes the real unit or soul as the predicate for physical unity, anticipates perspectivalist unity or coherence. Leibniz’s soul is modal and contingent: the army’s unity may be attributable to a quality intrinsic to the constituent parts of the unit, or it may be attributable to the perceiver perceiving unity, or not. Nietzsche’s perspectivalist truth extends Leibniz’s modalism in that a truth claim made about the unity of an object may satisfy the contextually determined criteria for truth, and that these criteria may be subject to contextual determination. For Nietzsche and Leibniz, that unity occurs denotes no necessary relation to principles of resemblance or arbitrariness, and neither does it necessitate the continuation of unity or continuity into any future.

Ilse’s flashing or filmic subjectivity fits more properly into a Nietzschean/Leibnizian model of coherence than into one based on ideal unity. She appears as (not in) successive frames, each of which suggests a composite of disparate parts, though each is modally unified by the contingently determined principle of Ilse (a contingency further emphasized by the ironic play of her name). No single appearance of Ilse is necessarily related to any other, and no appearance can promise its end point. Pökler’s love does not resolve Ilse’s modal unity into an ideal unity, though it does finally allow him to properly conceive Ilse as the disunity-unity she becomes for him. This conception of Ilse is also educative for the reader: the idea of identity the reader—like Pökler—must come to accept is based not on metaphysical knowledge of the ideal self but on the perspectivism and plurality of contextuality. Identity functions not in terms of ideal coherence, the self progressing from a clear beginning to a promised end, its actions and/or judgments unified around a proper unit; identity functions rather in terms of modal unities, contingently related points dispersed in ellipses of uncertainty produced by unpredicted/unpredictable trajectories which are never guaranteed from afar and yet which constitute the plurality of a proper self/proper selves.

Indeed, is the question of who or what still relevant when Pökler, “[o]n the last day,” makes his way into Dora and gives his “gold wedding ring” to “a random woman” (GR 432–33)? Like the composite point that opens the episode, the woman could be anyone—Ilse or Leni included—and Pökler could be motivated to give his ring for any reason and by any force. This scene, like so many others in GR and GM, relentlessly and irresolvably asks, “Which do you want it to be?” (GR 131).

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Notes

1 For useful discussions of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, see Maudemarie Clark and Arthur C. Danto.

2 For example, Joseph Tabbi, as part of his complaint about *GR*’s lack of “personal warmth,” cites Pökler as “the only one [of *GR*’s main characters] who is provided with a family (albeit a broken one), a fully imagined historical context, and a sufficient number of friends and professional acquaintances to take part in potential systems of caring and connection” (124). My point in raising Tabbi’s argument is not to contest it but to indicate the degree to which critics have appealed to the Pökler episode in *GR*, as an island in a storm, for conventions of narrative and character-level coherence. See also Brian McHale’s reading of the capacity of the Pökler “sequence” to “[allow] us to reconstruct the analogical pattern [of character comparison]” (80).

3 For a reading of the filmic real close to mine, see Hanjo Berressem 164–70.


5 A code name usually implies an original, true name; but we don’t know Erdmann’s or Schlepzig’s true name, so we have nothing to compare the code name to, which opens up the possibility that the code name may be true, or that the code name is one in a series of names in a network without identifiable beginning or end.

6 Concepts apposed to one another do not function according to a dialectical model of movement or progression. Instead of canceling out or sublation, we have a complex coexistence. Holding two ostensibly oppositional concepts together in apposition (like compositeness and coherence) leaves them equal in importance or status, and capable—together, in apposition—of explaining or describing Pökler’s desire for Ilse in its many complexities.

7 Later, when Pökler’s “quivering sphincter is centered right on Ground zero” (GR 425), he is, ironically, protected by the compositeness/unity of points. Were Ground zero or the Zero point the manifestation of an *a priori* ideal point, the “reluctant virgin” (426) would be much more likely—in duty to the ideal—to announce herself “right on top of Pökler.” But Zero points are definitionally composite: “Rockets [. . .] disperse about the aiming point in a giant ellipse—the Ellipse of Uncertainty” (425). There is no Zero point as such; there is only a distributive ellipse temporarily and contingently organized within a given field.

8 The Rescher edition I am using contains a translation of the *Monadology*, analyses and relevant indexes.
Works Cited


